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The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An
Independent Tort Action May Be the Only
Acceptable Alternative
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, "spoliation of evidence" involves the tampering with,
interference with, loss of, or destruction of evidence or potential evidence that
is to be used in an already pending or contemplated litigation.
There are two situations in which the issue of spoliation of evidence may
arise. First, when one of the parties to a pending or potential suit interferes
with the evidence. Second, when an independent, disinterested third party
interferes with the evidence. As will be discussed in this Note, it is the latter of
the two that poses the most difficult remedial problems.
The causes of action for spoliation of evidence also differ depending on
whether the destruction of the evidence was intentional or negligent. For
example, many remedial devices exist that serve to deter intentional spoliation
of evidence.1 However, few, if any, exist in the case of negligent spoliation of
evidence. As a result, in cases of negligent spoliation of evidence, an
independent tort action may be the aggrieved party's only remedial alternative.
This Note will examine the emerging tort action of negligent spoliation of
evidence. 2 Included is an introduction to the similar tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence and the current remedies and deterrents that exist to deal
with those situations. As will be discussed, the remedies available to a victim
of negligent spoliation are not necessarily the same as those available to the
victim of intentional spoliation. In addition, this Note will focus on whether
courts confronting the issue for the first time should adopt the new tort action.
I. INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
A. Situations in Which the Intentional Spoliation of Evidence Has Arisen
Possibly the best example of one party intentionally destroying evidence is
the California case of Smith v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles.3 In
1 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 177 (1967); see also Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher,
77 A.2d 548 (Del. 1950); Trupiano v. Cully, 84 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. 1957); McHugh v.
McHugh, 40 A. 410 (Pa. 1898).
2 This is distinct from the intentional spoliation of evidence. However, the tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence must be examined to fully comprehend the related
negligence tort.
3 151 Cal. App. 3d 491 (1984).
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Smith, the plaintiff was permanently blinded when a tire flew off of the van in
front of her and smashed into her windshield, causing pieces of glass to strike
her in the face. 4 Immediately after the accident, the van was towed to Abbott
Ford for repairs. The wheels had been previously installed on the van by
Abbott prior to the accident.5 While the van was there, Abbott Ford either
destroyed or lost the relevant parts of the van and van wheels, rendering any
inspection of the parts for design or production defects impossible.6
Mrs. Smith brought an action against Abbott for intentional spoliation of
evidence, claiming that she was damaged by Abbott's actions, which had
resulted in seriously diminishing the chances of receiving any compensation for
her injuries. 7 The trial court, however, refused to recognize this new tort, and
granted Abbott's demurrer.8 The plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate to
force the trial court to allow the spoliation cause of action. 9 The California
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could proceed with her cause of action
for interference with her civil litigation by Abbott's alleged intentional
spoliation of evidence, even though she could not plead her damages with
certainty. 10 Ironically, after the California Supreme Court denied Abbott's
request for rehearing, Abbott Ford found the relevant missing parts, and within
a few weeks the case was settled out of court."
B. Remedies
Although in Smith, the court eventually recognized the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence, this is not the only protection the law provides to
aggrieved parties. Other remedies and safeguards also exist to protect evidence
from being intentionally tampered with or destroyed.
1. Presumption
The oldest and most common method of dealing with the situation in which




7 Id. at 495.
8Id.
9Id.
10 Id. at 503.
11 Pati Jo PofahI, Comment, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of Intentional
Spoliation of Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 961, 961 n.4 (1985).
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back to seventeenth century England, 12 and is commonly referred to as the
doctrine of omnia praeswnuntur contra spoliatorem.13 This is the use of a
"presumption" against the destroying party. "[I]ntentional spoliation or
destruction of evidence relevant to a case raises a presumption, or, more
properly, an inference, that this evidence would have been unfavorable to the
cause of the spoliator."14
However, such a presumption or inference arises only when the spoliation
or destruction was intentional and indicates fraud. It does not arise if the
destruction was routine or with no fraudulent intent. 15 For example, documents
destroyed under a generally accepted document destruction policy of a
corporation with no intent to fraudulently destroy evidence would not entitle a
party to invoke the inference against the destroyer. 16
The other qualification of the doctrine is that the presumption is not
conclusive, but rebuttable. 17 "[Tihe inference may be overcome by evidence in
the record giving a satisfactory explanation, even when there is actual
tampering,"' 8 and "the opponent may always introduce such facts as serve to
explain away, on some other hypothesis, the apparent significance of the
fraudulent conduct." 19 Thus, the "presumption" remedy may be inadequate
because it does not provide a definite, certain penalty for the spoliation of the
evidence.
12 R. v. Arundel, Hob. 109 (1617) (dealing with non-production of title deeds which
the court assumed were intentionally suppressed); see also Comment, Omnnia Praeswnuntur
Contra Spoliatorem, 1 ADEL. L. REV. 344, 344 (1962).
13 Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 80 F.2d 32, 41-42
(8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 715 (1936); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 980
(5th ed. 1979).
14 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 177 (1967); see also WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 278
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) ("It has always been understood... that a party's falsehood or
otherfraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of
evidence by bribery or spoliation... is receivable against him as an indication of his
consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one."); Gumbs v. International
Harvester Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192,
194-95 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); United States v. Remington, 191
F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951); United States v. Freundlich, 95 F.2d 376, 378-79 (2d Cir.
1938).
15 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 177 (1967).
16 See Berthold-Jennings Lumber, 80 F.2d at 42.
17 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 177 (1967).
18 Wong v. Swier, 267 F.2d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 1959); see also Tilton v. Iowa Oil Co.,
33 P.2d 446, 448 (1934) ("Nevertheless we know of no authority which declares that the
presumption is conclusive.").
19 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 281 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
19921 1137
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. Criminal Statutes
Besides the use of the presumption against the interfering party, many
jurisdictions have also attempted to deal with issues of intentional spoliation of
evidence through the imposition of criminal obstruction of justice laws as
opposed to recognizing a new tort.20 These states are split between whether
intentional spoliation of evidence constitutes a felony or merely a
misdemeanor. 21 Generally, criminal statutes do not preclude civil liability for
the same criminal conduct. However, a number of courts have relied on the
existence of these criminal penalties in refusing to recognize tort actions for the
intentional spoliation of evidence. 22
Although a criminal statute may help deter parties from intentionally
destroying or suppressing evidence, it gives little or no remedy to the party that
is injured by the spoliator's action.23 For example, what compensation would
the plaintiff in the Smith case receive after realizing that her cause of action was
virtually nonexistent solely because the defendant had lost the necessary parts
of the van that she required to prove her case? Theoretically, her only remedial
measure would have been to possibly request the prosecuting attorney for that
jurisdiction to charge Abbott Ford with the obstruction of justice. This,
however, obviously fails to provide an adequate remedy for parties who have
lost a cause of action because of the spoliation of evidence.
3. Sanctions
The other remedy that exists for intentional spoliation of evidence is the
imposition of sanctions under the applicable state or federal rules of civil
procedure. Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
may impose sanctions upon a party for failing to comply with discovery
requests. 24 In addition, Rule 37 also permits the entry of a default judgment on
20 Pofahl, supra note 11, at 965-66; see also Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J.
Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY
L.J. 1085, 1087 (1987).
21 See generally ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
2809 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West
1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-610 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-155 (West
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.13 (West 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 31-4
(1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.32
(Anderson 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.295 (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4910 (1983);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.10 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306 (1990).
22 Pofahl, supra note 11, at 966.
23 Philip A. Lionberger, Interference With Prospective Gvil Litigation By Spoliation of
Evidence: Should Texas Adopt a New Tort?, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J 209, 226 (1989).
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 215(2)(b).
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a party who does not comply with a court order mandating discovery. 25
However, as with criminal statutes, this does little to compensate the aggrieved
party. Mere sanctions are not enough in comparison to the potential loss of an
entire cause of action. Further, although a default judgment compensates the
injured party because she wins the underlying action, the default judgment can
only be imposed after the party fails to comply with both a discovery request
and a court order compelling discovery. 26 Thus, a party "who destroys
evidence prior to a discovery request is unable to comply with any subsequent
request and therefore could not be punished for failing to comply."27
4. Independent Tort Action
Despite the existence of the previously mentioned safeguards, courts in
such states as California2 8 and Alaska29 have recently recognized the tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence, presumably because of the inadequacy of the
existing remedies for both compensating the aggrieved party and deterring the
spoliator.
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently faced the issue of intentional
spoliation of evidence in Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage.30 In Hazen, as a
result of an undercover police sting operation, plaintiff was arrested and
charged with assignation for prostitution.31 After the dismissal of the criminal
charges, the attorneys for the plaintiff instructed the arresting officers that a
tape recording made by them as part of the undercover operation would be
required as evidence in a civil suit that was to be filed against the officers for
false arrest, malicious prosecution, 'and defamation. 32 When the tape was
turned over to the plaintiff, it was no longer audible and was allegedly "taped
over" by the defendants. Immediately, plaintiff amended her complaint to add a
cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence, alleging that the tape was
tampered with by the defendants because it explicitly proved that she was
wrongly arrested for prostitution. 33 The court, relying on' Smith v. Superior
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
26 See Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1135 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 613 F.2d
314 (5th Cir. 1980); Lionberger, supra note 23, at 227-28; Comment, Spoliation: Cvil
Liability For Destrucion Of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 191, 207 (1985).
27 Pofahl, supra note 11, at 979.
2 8 Smith v. Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 496
(1984).
29 Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 458.
32 Id. at 459.
33 Id.
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Court,34 unanimously held that a common law cause of action did exist for
"intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoliation of
evidence." 35 The court, however, did not discuss its reasoning for adopting the
tort, and only stated that it did exist in Alaska, and thus plaintiff could maintain
her cause of action.
As for the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence, many of these
alternative remedies, such as criminal statutes, are not applicable, thus
requiring the tort to be adopted in order to both deter undesirable negligent
conduct and to compensate injured parties.
III. NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
The tort of negligent spoliation of evidence very much resembles that of
intentional spoliation of evidence. However, an "intent" by the opposing party
to destroy, misplace, or tamper with the evidence is not required.
A. Situations In Which Negligent Spoliation of Evidence Has Arisen
Negligent spoliation of evidence arises in two different contexts. First,
when one party to a pending or potential action unintentionally destroys or
loses evidence which, in turn, has a favorable effect on his position in the case.
For example, in a medical malpractice case in Florida, Bondu v. Gurvich,36 a
defendant hospital lost information, including medical and surgical treatment
notes and records, relating to the plaintiff's husband immediately before his
death on the operating table.37
The second context arises when an independent, totally disinterested third
party destroys or loses evidence in a pending litigation. This can best be
illustrated by considering the facts in Velasco v. Commercial Building
Maintenance Co.38 In Velasco, a janitor, while cleaning an attorney's desk,
threw out the remnants of a defective bottle that was to be the key evidence in a
potential products liability suit.3 9 These are the two prime cases in which
negligent spoliation of evidence has been explicitly recognized by the courts. 40
34 151 Cal. App. 3d 491 (1984).
35 Hazen, 718 P.2d at 463.
36 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. App. 1984), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1986).
37 Id. at 1309-10.
38 169 Cal. App. 3d 874 (1985).
39 Id. at 876.
40 Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312; Velasco, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 877.
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B. Alternatives to Adopting a New Tort
An independent tort action is by no means the only available remedial
device that exists to deal with the occurrence of negligent spoliation of
evidence. Relying upon the doctrine of omnia praeswnuntur contra
spoliatorem,41 some courts have adopted the use of the presumption or
inference that is used against parties who intentionally destroy evidence and
have applied it to parties in pending litigation who negligently destroy
evidence.42 Recently, the Sixth Circuit has upheld the use of inferences against
the spoliating party in Welsh v. United States.43 In this case, the defendants,
doctors and a Veterans Administration hospital, lost and/or destroyed crucial
bone specimens and medical records, thus precluding the plaintiff from proving
negligence or proximate cause in a medical malpractice suit against the
physician and hospital. 44 However, due to the defendants' negligence, the
district court inferred these two requirements of negligence and causation, and
found for the plaintiff.45 In addition, the Supreme Court of Florida has upheld
the use of a rebuttable presumption against those who negligently render
potential evidence unavailable. 46
Although the doctrine of omniapraeswnuntur contra spoliatorem may be a
viable alternative to deal with negligent spoliation of evidence, it may only be
invoked when it is a party to the pending or potential litigation that has
destroyed the evidence. For example, in the case of the defective bottle
discarded by the unknowing janitor, a presumption could not be used against
the spoliator because he was not a party to the initial litigation. Further, the
Florida Supreme Court's use of the presumption was also based on the
availability of sanctions against the destroying party under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.380(b)(2) to deter this type of conduct. 47 Thus, because sanctions
41 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
42 See generally Laurie S. Longinotti, Comment, Evidence-Welsh v. United States:
Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: 77e Creation of a Rebuttable Preswnption, 19 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 229, 230-33 (1989).
43 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988).
44 Id. at 1240-43. The action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, under
which liability is determined according to the substantive law of the state in which the
alleged negligent action occured. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-20
(1957). Under Kentucky law, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must prove
negligence and proximate cause. Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1965).
45 Welsh, 844 F.2d at 1243.
46 Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987). The presumption is
incorporated under either section 90.302(1) or 90.302(2) of Florida Statutes, by shifting
either the burden of proof or the burden of persuasion. Id. at 600. See also C. Ehrhardt,
FLORiDA EVIDENCE § 302.1 (2d ed. 1984).
47 Public Health Trust, 507 So. 2d at 599.
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may not be levied upon a disinterested, independent third party, an independent
tort action for negligent spoliation of evidence is the only means to deter the
negligent destruction of evidence and to compensate the aggrieved party for its
destruction.
C. History of the Tort Action of Negligent Spoliation of Evidence
Although the history of the doctrine of omnia praesumuntur contra
spoliatorem, or simply "the presumption," can be traced back to the famous
law school property case of Armory v. Delamirie,48 and even further back to R.
v. Arundel,49 the tort action for negligent spoliation of evidence has no such
classical history.
The cause of action was first recognized implicitly by the Supreme Court
of California in Williams v. State.50 In Williams, the plaintiff was injured when
a portion of a brake drum broke off of a passing truck and struck her
windshield. The plaintiff alleged that members of the California Highway
Patrol who investigated the accident failed to identify other witnesses or attempt
to find the truck that had dislodged part of its brake drum. Thus, the officers'
negligence in the investigation severely prejudiced, and in essence precluded,
the plaintiff's chance of recovery from either the truck driver or the
manufacturer of the truck. 51 The California Supreme Court held that because
the officers did not owe a duty to protect plaintiff's prospects for recovery by
civil litigation,52 there was no cause of action for the negligent destruction of
plaintiff's chance of recovery from the truck driver and/or manufacturer. 53
One year later, the Florida Court of Appeals, in Bondu v. Gurvich,54
explicitly recognized a cause of action for the loss or destruction of medical
records by the defendant hospital. 55 The court stated:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress
of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the
48 1 Strange 506, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
49 Hob. 109, 80 Eng. Rep. 258 (1617).
50 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983); see also Pirocchi v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp.
277 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
51 Williams, 664 P.2d at 138.
52 CAL. VEH. CODE § 2412 (West 1987); Winklemen v. City of Sunnyvale, 59 Cal.
App. 3d 509, 511 (1976); McCarthy v. Frost, 33 Cal. App. 3d. 872, 876 (1973).
53 Williams, 664 P.2d at 143.
54 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. App. 1984).
55 Id. at 1312-13 ("Since Mrs. Bondu alleges that this duty was breached by the
hospital when it failed to furnish Mr. Bondu's records to her, and that this breach caused
her damage in that she lost 'a medical negligence lawsuit when [she] could not provide
expert witnesses,' her complaint states a cause of action.").
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court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none has
been recognized before.... The law of torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the
plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a
bar to the remedy.5 6
However, the court did qualify this, requiring that before a cause of action
exists for negligent spoliation of evidence, there must be: "(1) the existence of
a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct for the protection of others including the plaintiff; (2) a
failure on the part of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) an injury or
damage to the plaintiff proximately caused by such failure." 57
In Bondu, contrary to Williams, a state statute explicitly required the
defendant hospital to retain the plaintiff's medical records.58 Therefore, the
required "duty" on the part of the defendant did exist, with which the
defendant failed to comply.59 The most troubling aspect of the court's decision
dealt with the issue of damages. Although the court explicitly required "an
injury or damage to the plaintiff proximately caused by such failure," 60 the
court merely stated that she was damaged since she lost the potential to pursue
a medical negligence lawsuit. As will be discussed in section Ill-E, the
speculative nature of the damages has caused numerous jurisdictions to either
refuse to recognize the spoliation causes of action or to limit the circumstances
in which they can be brought.
In 1985, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District, basing its
decision on the same criteria as the Smith court's recognition of intentional
spoliation of evidence, formally recognized a cause of action for the negligent
destruction of evidence needed for prospective civil litigation. 61 Other states,
such as Illinois and Minnesota, have not explicitly accepted the new tort, but
have done so implicitly. For example, in Illinois, the State Court of Appeals
seemed to infer that the tort had been previously recognized in dicta in another
opinion, but due to the untimeliness of the complaint, the plaintiff's cause of
action was premature. 62
5 6 1d. at 1312 (quoting W. PAGE PROSsER, PROSSER AND KEErON ON TORTS § 1 (4th
ed. 1971)).
57 Id. at 1312; see also Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla.
App. 1983).
58 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.202 (West 1979).
59 Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1313.
60 Id. at 1312.
61 Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 877 (1985).
62 Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 556 N.E.2d 913, 915 (Ill. App. 1990). "However,
the Fox court held the plaintiff's spoliation of evidence action was premature .... In the
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Federated Mut. Ins. v.
Litchfield Precision Components, Inc.,63 also implicitly recognized the tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence. The court, however, required that the plaintiff
fully pursue his pre-existing cause of action to its full extent before filing the
spoliation cause of action, so that damages due to the destruction of evidence
could be ascertained with greater certainty. Simply put, the effects that the
destruction of the evidence have on the underlying action cannot be fully
determined until the results of the underlying action are first determined.64
D. The Most Recent Decisions
Although a trend can be seen in recognizing the causes of action, some
courts have refused to adopt the torts of intentional spoliation and negligent
spoliation of evidence. 65 But upon examination of these opinions, it is difficult
to ascertain whether each court felt that the tort should never be recognized, or
whether based upon the applicable facts, it was not necessary and/or proper to
recognize the particular tort at that time.
One of the most recent, more famous cases still pending, Trump Taj Mahal
v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni,66 involves a spoliation of evidence
issue. On October 10, 1989, three high-level executives of Donald Trump's
Atlantic City Casino operations were killed when their helicopter began to
disintegrate in mid-air.67 Shortly after the accident, the defendant-manufacturer
of the helicopter agreed to allow plaintiffs' representatives to "inspect,
examine, and photograph the failed components of the accident helicopter
which were in Agusta defendants' custody, yet breached the agreement by
sending the parts to Italy, where plaintiffs alleged they were partially
present case, we ... need not decide whether a wide ranging common law spoliation of
evidence tort should be recognized. . . ." Id. at 915-16.
63 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990).
6 4 1d. at 439.
65 See La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986) (court refused to
adopt spoliation of evidence as a tort action; however, the plaintiff already had two causes
of action for recovery for injuries she sustained because of defendant's conduct); Koplin v.
Rose Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) ("[Ajbsent some
independent tort, contract, agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or special relationship
of the parties, the new tort of 'the intentional interference with a prospective civil action by
spoliation of evidence' should not be recognized in Kansas."); Miller v. Montgomery
County, 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) ("[Here the alleged spoliation was
by a party to the cause and as against such party there is no separate cause of action because
there is no basis or need for one .... ").
66 761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991), aft'd, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992).
67 Brief for Appellants at 9, Trump Taj Mahal v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni,
No. 91-5295 (3d Cir. 1991).
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destroyed." 68 The District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed
plaintiffs' cause of action on this count because the torts of intentional and/or
negligent spoliation of evidence had never previously been recognized in New
Jersey.69
However, the New Jersey Court of Appeals has, at least implicitly,
recently adopted the tort of spoliation of evidence. 70 In a decision handed down
October 1, 1991, the appellate court allowed the plaintiff's cause of action
against the defendant who fraudulently concealed information concerning the
plaintiff's product liability action against the manufacturer of an industrial
press.71 The Third Circuit was been apprised of the recent Appellate Court
decision for their consideration of the Trump appeal. 72 However, despite the
Viviano decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court without
opinion. 73 Because the Third Circuit affirmed the district court without issuing
an opinion, it is difficult to know why it ignored the New Jersey Court of
Appeals decision in Viviano.
E. The Speculativeness of Damages
The greatest potential issue in both intentional and negligent spoliation of
evidence cases is the amount of damages the aggrieved party actually incurs
due to the destruction or concealment of the evidence. 74 As was stated in the
Bondu case, the injury to the party must be proximately caused by the
defendant's spoliation of the evidence. 75 But what damage does the aggrieved
party actually suffer?
68 Id. at 10.
69 Trump TajMahal, 761 F. Supp. at 1162.
70 Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 549-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991),
cert. denied, 606 A.2d 375 (N.J. 1992).
71 Id.
72 Letter from Catherine Slavin, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant Trump Taj Mahal to
author (Dec. 9, 1991).
73 Trump Ta Majal v. Constructioni Aeronautich Giovanni, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir.
1992).
74 See generally Paul Gary Kerkorian, Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: Skirfing the
"Suit Within a Suit" Requirement of Legal Malpractice Actions, 41 HASTINGS L. 1077,
1100-03 (1990).
75 Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (Fla. App. 1984).
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1. The General Rule of Permitting Flexibility in the Pleading and Proof
of Damages
In the case where the spoliating party is a party to the underlying action,
the general rule is to allow flexibility in the pleading and proof of damages. 76
This is because the opposing party has made it more difficult for the aggrieved
party to prove its case. In addition, the relaxation of the proof of certainty of
damages deters careless handling of important, relevant evidence to a pending
action by the opposing party. This obviously would not apply to a situation
where the spoliator is an independent, disinterested third party. Because in this
situation the spoliating party generally gains nothing from the destruction of the
evidence, there is not as great a social imperative or need to deter this type of
negligent behavior.
2. The Two Extreme Positions
Although the relaxation doctrine is a generally accepted principle,77 courts
that have faced the issue have adopted two extreme positions. The California
courts by far are the most lenient in the damages requirement. As was stated by
the Smith court:
[When] the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles ofjustice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve
the wrongdoer from making amends for his acts. In such case, while the
damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be
enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and
reasonable inference, although the result is only approximate. 78
This approach views the aggrieved party's damages as an injury to the
expectancy of recovery, not to the recovery itself. 79
76 Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522, 533 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Flexibility in permitting
proof of damages is particularly appropriate where, as here, it is the defendant's allegedly
wrongful conduct that frustrates more precise calculations."); see also Strobl v. New York
Mercantile Exch., 582 F. Supp. 770, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd on reh'g, 768 F.2d 22 (2d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
77 See supra note 76.
78 Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 500 (1984) (quoting Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
79 Kerkorian, supra note 74, at 1078.
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The Illinois and Minnesota cases represent the other extreme position. The
two most cited cases in Illinois80 have both held that damages from the
spoliation need to be proven for the spoliation case to survive summary
judgment. In Fox v. Cohen,8' the plaintiff filed a spoliation action against a
hospital that had misplaced EKG tracings and reports that were necessary to
prove a medical malpractice claim against the decedent plaintiffs physicians.
The Illinois Court of Appeals dismissed the action since the malpractice case
had not yet been fully adjudicated and thus plaintiff could not prove damages
due to the misplacement of the EKG tracings.82 The court stated that the fact
that the plaintiff may lose her medical malpractice action is "purely speculative
and uncertain." 83 The court further stated that "[t]he injury must be actual; the
threat of future harm not yet realized is not enough." 84 In addition, the court
held that "[l]iability cannot be based upon mere surmise or conjecture as to the
cause of the injury."8 5
In addition, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has explicitly followed the
Illinois rule requiring a resolution of the underlying claim before proceeding
with a cause of action for spoliation of evidence.86 The court in Federated held
that the uncertainty of damages prior to the resolution is just too great in a
spoliation case and thus the underlying case must be pursued to its full
disposition before raising a claim for spoliation of evidence.87 While reducing
the problem of speculativeness of damages, this position raises another
problem, namely that of prolonged and excessive litigation. In Illinois and
Minnesota, it appears as though the underlying action must be fully
adjudicated, including all avenues of appeal. Because of the excessive caseload
dockets carried today, this could theoretically require the aggrieved party to
wait for the initial trial, wait for the corresponding first level of appeals to the
intermediary appellate court, and further wait for possible appeals to the state's
supreme court. In total this could mean that the party must wait well over a
decade before filing a spoliation action.
80 Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312 (1ll. App. Ct. 1986); Fox v.
Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (1. App. Ct. 1980).
81 406 N.E.2d 178 (111. App. Ct. 1980).
82 Id. at 183.
83 Id.
84 Id. (citing W. PAGE KEErON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, 143 (4th ed.
1971)).
85 Id. at 183 (citing Driscoll v. C. Rasmussen Corp., 219 N.E.2d 483 (1. 1966)); see
also Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (111. App. Ct. 1986); DM1,
Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 402 N.E.2d 805, 806-07 (111. App. Ct. 1980).
86 Federated Mut. Ins. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434,
438 (Minn. 1990).
87 Id. at 439; see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn.
1982).
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The problem of excessively speculative damages is nothing new to courts,
which have generally dealt with the issue leniently from the plaintiff's
perspective. Consider the recovery of damages for lost profits. Whether the
action is in contract or tort, courts have historically required the plaintiff to
merely present the "best evidence available" as to the amount of the
damages.88 The aggrieved party is required to do no more.89 A different
formulation of the standard of proof is the requirement that plaintiff show a
"reasonable basis" for the calculation of lost profits damage.90 The United
States Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that "[c]ertainty as to the amount
goes no further than to require a basis for a reasoned conclusion." 91 Thus,
negligent spoliation of evidence cases would not be the first situations before
the courts that involve extremely speculative damages.
3. Punitive Damages
The only reference to the potential of punitive damages in spoliation cases
appears in the recently released opinion of the New Jersey Court of Appeals in
Viviano v. CBS, Inc..92 The case involved an independent, disinterested third
party's failure to produce a memorandum that disclosed the reason for
plaintiff's accident. The memo also specifically named the manufacturer of a
defective electric timer that probably caused the plaintiff to crush her hand
while using an industrial press.93 "By suppressing the.., memorandum and
removing the timer, CBS led plaintiff and her counsel down a primrose
path," 94 which caused the plaintiff a delay of four or five years in the
resolution of her product liability claim against the timer manufacturer. 95
88 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGEs FOR LOsT PROFfrs § 5.3 (2d ed.
1981).
89 See Knightsbridge Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Promociones Y Proyectos, S.A., 728 F.2d
572, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1984); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 614 P.2d 1272, 1276 (Wash.
1980).
90 DUNN, supra note 88, at § 5.4; see also Polaris Indus. v. Plastics, Inc., 299
N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. 1980) ("a reasonable basis on which to determine plaintiff's
loss"); Lundgren, 614 P.2d at 1276 ("Lost profits are recoverable to the extent the evidence
permits their estimation with reasonable certainty.").
91 Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 561 (1941).
92 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert. denied, 606 A.2d 375 (NJ.
1992). Note that this case involved the "fraudulent concealment of evidence." However, the
court stated that this cause of action is analogous to the recently recognized tort of spoliation
of evidence. Id. at 549-50.
93 Id. at 545-46.
94 Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 503 A.2d 296, 306 (N.J. 1986).
95 iviano, 597 A.2d at 551.
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The court stated that there was a sufficient basis for the award of punitive
damages because of the existence of "substantial evidence of intentional
wrongdoing in the sense of an 'evil minded act' or an act accompanied by
wanton and wilfid disregard of the rights of another."96 The court then stated
that it was an apt case for the award of punitive damages which are intended to
punish a tortfeasor and to deter him and others from similar conduct. 97
This appears to be the only spoliation case awarding punitive damages.
Ironically, the case involved a disinterested, independent third party that had
failed to produce the evidence. One would logically expect punitive damages to
be awarded in cases in which the spoliator was a party to the underlying action,
because generally the goal of deterring his destruction of the evidence is an
even greater social imperative compared to the deterrence of such action by
third parties.98 "Such damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full
compensation for the injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of
teaching the defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others from
following the defendant's example." 99
IV. THE NEED FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENT
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
Although it is a well accepted principle that the negligent spoliation of
evidence is a type of conduct that should be deterred, many courts have refused
to adopt the new tort, stating that appropriate safeguards currently exist to deter
this type of conduct. 1°° In Miller v. Montgomery County,101 a Maryland Court
of Appeals refused to adopt the new tort because the destroying party was
already a party to the underlying action, and thus the jury could be instructed to
infer that the destroyed evidence would have been detrimental to the
defendant's case had the defendant not destroyed it. 102 The Supreme Court of
Arizona similarly felt that the plaintiff had sufficient compensation against a
defendant who suppressed evidence in the pending litigation.' 0 3 However,
these rationales for refusing to adopt the tort cannot be extended to the cases in
which the independent, disinterested third party destroys the evidence. Because
96 Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added) (citing Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell &
Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1230 (N.J. 1984)).
97 Viviano, 597 A.2d at 551 (citing Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 472 A.2d 577,
584 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), afid, 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986)).
98 For a review of the imposition of punitive damages, see generally DAN B. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIEs § 3.9 (1973).
99 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 2 at 9 (5th ed. 1984).
100 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
101 494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
10 2 Id.; see also Lionberger, supra note 23, at 218.
103 La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986).
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the spoliator is not a party to the underlying action, the doctrine of omnia
praesumuntur contra spoliatorem cannot be invoked, nor are judicial sanctions
available. In addition, the statutes that do deal with the destruction of evidence
generally require a certain degree of mens rea (a "culpable mental state") to
constitute a violation, and do not impose strict liability. 104 Thus, they do not
apply to the case where the destruction is merely due to one's negligence, nor
do they compensate the aggrieved party in any way.105 This means that the
only adequate alternative in many situations for the aggrieved party is an
independent tort action for negligent spoliation of evidence or for negligent
interference with prospective civil litigation. 106
A. The Drawbacks and Social Costs of Recognizing the New Tort
Although the need does exist for jurisdictions to adopt the tort of negligent
spoliation of evidence, costs do exist. Obviously, the first "social cost" of any
tort or new cause of action, spoliation included, is the potential of increased
litigation. Although this may be good news for attorneys, the majority of the
American public views it as a drain on fiscal resources.
Individuals have many interests for which they claim protection from the
law, and which the law will recognize as worthy of protection.... The
administration of the law becomes a process of weighing the interests for which
the plaintiff demands protection against the defendant's claim to untrammeled
freedom in the furtherance of defendant's desires, together with the importance
of those desires themselves.1 07
Both courts and commentators have written that adequate remedies exist to
deter spoliation of evidence, and thus an increase in court dockets is
unnecessary. 10 8 The other problem is that although the defendant in a negligent
spoliation case did perform some type of socially undesirable negligent
conduct, there is a certain unfairness in subjecting him to extremely speculative
damages. 10 9 For example, the evidence that was destroyed by the spoliating
party may in fact end up not being detrimental to the underlying action when
104 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
105 Lionberger, supra note 23, at 219-20.
106 The terms are generally interchangeable. The latter recognizes the Smith court's
view of the damages in this situation being the loss of the prospects of recovery in a civil
suit.
107 W. PAGE KEErON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTs § 3, at 16 (5th ed. 1984).
108 Solum & Marzen, supra note 20, at 1086-1137; see also La Raia v. Superior
Court, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986); Miller v. Montgomery County, 494 A.2d 761, 768
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
109 E.g., Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
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that action is finally adjudicated. Thus, the requirements of Illinois and
Minnesota that the underlying action be fully adjudicated helps relieve this
potential injustice.110
In addition to being extremely speculative, damages for spoliation of
evidence can be extremely disproportionate to the culpability of the negligent
party. For instance, the janitor in Velasco could have been subject to excessive
damages for merely throwing out a broken bottle, which turned out to be the
prime, if not the only, evidence in the plaintiff's potential product liability
claim."' A picture may be worth a thousand words, but a piece of evidence
may be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. No court has yet confronted
the issue of disproportionate damages that negligent spoliation of evidence
actions may produce. However, it is doubtful that any jurisdiction would be
extremely concerned with the issue. Damages for tort actions often rely on "the
luck of the draw." For example, consider the typical automobile accident, in
which the culpable party is responsible for the damages caused to the injured
party. The defendant could be liable for an extreme amount of damages for
injuring or killing a neurosurgeon in her mid-thirties, while damages might be
minimal for the same accident if the injured party was a retired man in his early
eighties. Further, although potential drawbacks exist with the adoption of every
new cause of action, there are also potential benefits.
B. The Benefits of Recognizing the New Tort
There are at least two societal benefits in recognizing the cause of action
for negligent spoliation of evidence. First, the tort serves to deter undesirable
conduct on the part of the defendant. This is evident in the situation where the
spoliator is a party to the already pending litigation. The tort helps to assure
that the parties will handle evidence carefully and with the utmost diligence, as
opposed to hoping that undesirable evidence may disappear in favor of their
position in the litigation. The preservation of evidence can only serve to further
the fair adjudication of claims. Thus, any procedure that encourages the
preservation of evidence furthers the quality of American jurisprudence.
Second, as stated in Section IV, the currently available remedies may not
adequately compensate the aggrieved party. 112 Thus, the current system may
not be able to put the plaintiff in the position that he was in before the
destruction of his evidence. The cause of action for negligent spoliation of
evidence has the potential, in many situations, of solving this discrepancy.
Although any new tort may be viewed as a drain on judicial resources, a
110 See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
I11 Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 874, 876
(1985).
112 See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
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thorough inquiry into its potential benefits must be completed before any
judgment on whether the action should be adopted is passed upon.
V. IMPLEMENTING THE INDEPENDENT TORT ACION
The tort of negligent spoliation of evidence should be adopted by those
jurisdictions that have not yet faced the issue. "[B]ecause [an] independent
action for the spoliation of evidence is a better means for achieving the desired
goals of compensating injured parties and deterring future destruction of
evidence, [states] should adopt this new tort. -113
Since the safeguards pertaining to intentional spoliation of evidence are not
transferable to the cases of negligent spoliation of evidence, 114 there exist few,
if any, safeguards to deter the negligent handling of evidence. In addition, the
compensation to the aggrieved party is minimal absent an independent tort
action.
Although the tort should be adopted, the question arises as to when the
aggrieved party should be allowed to bring the action. Must the party wait until
the underlying action is fully adjudicated and all avenues of appeal
exhausted? 115 Or rather, should the plaintiff merely be required to plead
damages with minimal specificity? 116
A. Situations in Which the Spoliator is Already a Party to a Pending
Action
If the spoliator is already a party to the underlying litigation, the spoliation
action should be allowed to be immediately filed. This would potentially reduce
a repetition of efforts on the part of the parties and the courts. Allowing the
spoliation suit to go hand-in-hand with the underlying action would prevent a
duplication of efforts in producing the same general evidence and witnesses that
were brought in the original action. In addition, the problem of the spoliation
suit being tried a considerable number of years after the alleged conduct occurs
is solved.
113 Lionberger, supra note 23, at 220.
114 As stated, generally penal statutes do not apply to negligence situations and
sanctions are not available against an individual who is not a party to the underlying action.
115 Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178, 183 (1. App. Ct. 1980) (citing Driscoll v.
Rasmussen Corp., 219 N.E.2d 483 (I. 1966)); see also Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.,
501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (111. App. Ct. 1986); DMI, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 402
N.E.2d 805, 806-07 (11. App. Ct. 1980); Federated Mut. Ins. v. Litchfield Precision
Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. 1990).
116 Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 500 (1984) (citing Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
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Theoretically, if the suit were required to be stayed until the final
disposition of the underlying action, it might actually encourage rather than
deter a party from negligently or intentionally destroying or losing evidence. In
some situations delays may benefit a party, and the excess of the benefits the
party receives over the potential costs may persuade that party to not fully
protect evidence. Although damage computation is extremely speculative,
determining the amount of damages is no more speculative than in cases of lost
profits or damages from loss of a prospective business opportunity. "Where
injury to some degree is found, we do not preclude recovery for lack of precise
proof. We do the best we can with what we have. We do not, 'in the
assessment of damages, require a mathematical precision in situations of injury
where, from the very nature of the circumstances precision is unattainable.'" 17
In addition, it must be remembered that it is because of the spoliator's own
actions which renders the damages speculative." 8 Thus, it is not that unjust to
relax the damage certainty standard in these situations.
B. Situations in Which the Spoliator is an Independent, Disinterested
Third Party
If the spoliator is an independent, disinterested third party, the same
question arises as to when the tort action should be allowed to be filed. The
major difference is that the spoliator generally has nothing to gain by the
destruction of the evidence. Thus, it may not be as great a social imperative to
allow the spoliation suit to be brought immediately, but rather to require the
aggrieved party to wait until the litigants in the underlying action resolve their
dispute.
The problem again is that the aggrieved party may be damaged today due
to the spoliator's negligence; however, he may be forced to wait a considerable
number of years before he can bring any type of action. In the case of a
product liability action, for example, if the spoliator loses or destroys the
defective product it may completely destroy any potential for recovery from the
manufacturer that the plaintiff would have had. However, the plaintiff must
now wait until the product liability suit is completely adjudicated before he can
seek any damages for the spoliation, which would be his only recovery.
Again, if the spoliation suit were allowed to be filed immediately, there is a
potential that the spoliator could be joined in the pending litigation, possibly as
either a necessary party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure" 9 or a similar state rule, or possibly as a permissive party under
117 Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Mich. 1976) (quoting Godwin
v. Ace Iron & Metal Co., 137 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Mich. 1965)).
118 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
119 FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a).
11531992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Rule 20.120 This would reduce any duplication of efforts in retrying the
underlying action to determine the extent of the damages proximately caused by
the negligent spoliation. 121
If courts are troubled by subjecting independent third parties to excessive,
and perhaps speculative, damages, they could conceivably adopt a requirement
similar to Illinois and Minnesota, which require the damaged party to wait until
the underlying claim is fully adjudicated so that damages can be ascertained
with greater certainty. 122 Correspondingly, in the case of the spoliation being
caused by the negligence of an already existing party to the litigation, the court
could allow the spoliation action to be brought immediately without the delay,
thus ensuring that the parties to the existing litigation are adequately deterred
from "accidentally misplacing or discarding" evidence.
Which "timing" alternative or combination of alternatives a jurisdiction
eventually chooses to adopt is uncertain, but it can be seen from the trend over
the past eight years that the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence will be
recognized by most jurisdictions that are given the opportunity to adopt it.123
VI. CONCLUSION
Viewing the social costs of adopting a new cause of action, primarily
increased litigation and the potential of subjecting a defendant to excessively
speculative damages, some may argue that recognizing the tort of negligent
spoliation of evidence would not be in the best interest of American
jurisprudence. However, the destruction of evidence is conduct that must be
deterred, and alternatively, compensated for when it does occur. Since the
present systems in most jurisdictions do not adequately deter nor compensate
aggrieved parties, the adoption of an independent cause of action for the
negligent spoliation of evidence may be the only acceptable alternative.
John K. Stipancich
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
121 Of course, any of these alternatives could easily be adopted to apply to the cases of
intentional spoliation of evidence, but since numerous safeguards and remedial measures
currently exist in those cases, there is not such a great imperative to recognize the tort
action.
122 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
123 Lionberger, supra note 23, at 230-32; see also Comment, supra note 26, at 198;
Comment, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.I. 1665, 1680 (1979).
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